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statutes,"' but it found that in Robinson, the one U.S.-based communication that took place
met its higher standard.
V. Discovery
CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH BORGEN*

U.S. law provides litigants with a variety of means to obtain evidence from foreign jurisdictions. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Federal Rules) and rules of state courts may
be used if a U.S. court has jurisdiction over the person who is in control of the evidence in
question.' Section 1783 of tide 28 of the United States Code provides a means for serving
a subpoena on U.S. nationals or residents abroad. Litigants may also obtain foreign discovery
through letters rogatory as permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1781 and treaties such as the Hague
Convention on Taking Evidence (the Hague Convention)."' U.S. law also provides litigants,
who are before foreign or international tribunals, access to evidence in the United States through
letters rogatory, the Hague Convention, and the extraordinarily generous procedure prescribed
by 28 U.S.C. § 1782. Varying discovery procedures sounding in international conventions
federal courts are given discretion
or domestic statutes coexist in the American court system;
114
in crafting the solution which best fits the case at bar.
DISCOVERY IN AID OF FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
There were a number of noteworthy developments in 1997 involving section 1782 in the
Second Circuit, the jurisdiction with perhaps the most developed-and the most generouscaselaw on the statute.

A.

1.Section 1782 May Not Reach Evidence Abroad
Although the discussion was dicta, the Second Circuit indicated that section 1782 could
not be used to reach evidence located outside of the United States but still under the control
of persons or entities resident in the United States. In In re Application of Sarrio, S.A., "' the
court noted first that "[o]n its face, § 1782 does not limit its discovery power to documents

located in the United States." Based on the legislative history".. and a declaration by Professor
Hans Smit, who had assisted in drafting the final version of the statute,"' however, the Second
to think
Circuit concluded that "despite the statute's unrestrictive language, there is reason
'" s
that Congress intended to reach only evidence located within the United States.

Ill. Id. at 906 (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
*Christopher Joseph Borgen is an associate with Debevoise & Plimpton in New York, New York.
112. See,e.g.,FED. R. Crv. P. 28(b).
113. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970,
23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
114. See generally Societe Nationale Industielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
115. 119 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1997).
116. Id. (quoting S. Rap. No. 88-1580(1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N 3782, 3788 (emphasizing that
purpose of statute is "in obtaining oral and documentary evidence in the United States.")) (emphasis added by
court).

117. Id. (stating that if the statute were interpreted to have such an extraterritorial reach, United States courts
would become the "clearing houses" for discovery the world over).
118. Id.
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2. The Second Circuit Reinforces Its Position that Evidence Sougbt Under Section 1782 Need Not
Be Discoverable in the Foreign Court
Unlike most other circuits, the Second Circuit has held that there is no requirement that
evidence requested pursuant to section 1782 be discoverable under the rules of the foreign or
international tribunal." 9 In particular two decisions in the past year-one from the District of
Connecticut and one from the Second Circuit itself-illustrate the strict constraints that the
Second Circuit places on a district court's discretion in assessing discovery requests for proceedings before foreign tribunals.
In In re Application of Metallgesellscbaft AG, the Second Circuit reiterated its rejection of any
requirement that evidence sought in the United States pursuant to § 1782(a) be discoverable
under the laws of the foreign country that isthe locus of the underlying proceeding; "[s]imilarly,
we have held that a district court may not refuse a request for discovery pursuant to § 1782
because a foreign tribunal has not yet had the opportunity to consider the request.' 120 The
court reversed the district court's denial of the section 1782 petition, which had been based
on a concern that granting U.S.-style discovery would skew the foreign litigation. The denial
was an abuse of discretion because the proper response to such a concern was to craft a "closely
tailored discovery order rather than .

..

simply denying relief outright."..

Following the Second Circuit's dictate that discoverability in the foreign jurisdiction is not
a valid factor, the district court in In re Application of CBG Corporation Geneva,12 1 observed that
"[the American litigation should not become, as here, a battle-by-affidavit of international
legal experts." 2 ' Noting that under the Second Circuit's standard only authoritative proof that
a foreign tribunal would reject the requested evidence could be considered, the district court
granted the petition.' 2 ' However, what precisely constituted authoritative proof, short of the
tribunal itself ruling that it would not accept the evidence in question, was left unclear by the
court's ruling. 2 '
Although the view that discoverability may not be considered on a section 1782 application
is most closely linked to the Second Circuit's line of cases, certain other courts have applied
a similar rule. See, for instance, In re Geert Duizenstraal, a case from the Northern District of
Texas in which the district court found that, based on the statutory text, Fifth Circuit precedent,
and Second Circuit precedent, there was no discoverability requirement in section 1782.126
3. Section 1782 May Not Be Invoked in Favor of PrivateArbitrations
In In the Matter of Application of Medway Power Limited, a New York district court held that
an "arbitration is not a tribunal for the purposes of § 1782. ' ' 27 A critical difference for the
119. See Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995).
120. 121 F.3d 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 80 (quoting Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1101).
122. 1997 WL 348053 (D.Conn. 1997).
123. Id. at *3.
124. Id. at *4,
125. See id. at *5. (stating that whether or not a deposition isallowed under British law should not be decided
based on affidavits, but left to the British judicial officer); compare In re Application of Noboa, No. M18-302,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14402 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 4, 1995) (delaying deposition in order to prevent potentially
duplicative discovery, because, unlike the facts in CBG, time was not of the essence); see also International Legal
Development Year In Review, 31 INT'L LAw. 335 (1996).
126. 1997 WL 195443 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 1997); see also In re Letters Rogatory from the First Court
of First Instance in Civil Matters, Caracas, Venezuela, 42 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1995).
127. 985 F. Supp. 402, 403 (S.D.N.Y 1997), appeal disrmissed, No. 97-9540 (2d Cir. Dec. 24, 1997).
VOL. 32, NO. 2
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court was that "arbitrators are not officials of foreign sovereign governments, but private persons
tested with their decision-making authority most commonly as aresult of private parties' entering
into contractual arrangements for their private resolution of disputes."' 28 In 1964, section 1782
was amended such that "judicial proceeding" was replaced by "proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal." 2 9 This change was not meant to sweep in arbitrations, but rather "was
intended to make the statute available to foreign governmental agencies exercising a judicial
or quasi-judicial function as well as to 'conventional' courts.""...
In reachingthis decision, thedistrict court distinguished In reApplication ofTecbnostroyexport,"'
finding that its statement that an arbitrator or arbitration panel is a tribunal under section 1782
was dicta and without support. Moreover, the parties in Tecbnostroyexport were bound by an
arbitration agreement, while the person from whom discovery was sought in Medway was a
third party that was not contractually obligated to recognize the arbitrator's authority.
The district court concluded by stating that the proper procedure would be for the arbitrator
to begin proceedings for an order of compulsion before a real tribunal, in this case an English
court." 2 The English court could then compel a non-party to provide evidence.
B.

INTERNATIONAL DISCOVERY IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE U.S. COURTS.

1. The Relationsbip of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the Hague Convention
Decisions in 1997 have provided further proof that, given a choice between the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention in cases involving international litigants,
U.S. federal courts are strongly inclined to resort to the Federal Rules, finding that the Hague
Convention does not trump the Federal Rules, and that the latter are often preferable for
reasons of efficiency.
In In reAircrasbDisasterNearRoselawn Indiana,the defendants, foreign aircraft manufacturers,
argued that they were not subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as

discovery in such a case must proceed exclusively under the Hague Convention."' Moreover,
the defendants argued that, in deference to French sovereign interests, the French civil code
should control the discovery of documents found in France. 4
Noting that the discovery rules set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Hague Convention are both the law of the United States and that there was nothing in the
record "showing that the Hague Convention discovery would prove any more effective than"
the Federal Rules, the district court stated that "[i]t is easily apparent from applicable case
law, that there is absolutely no valid reason or justification for abandoning the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in favor of the Hague Convention method of discovery.""' Not only had
the foreign defendants not shown that French law was in jeopardy, they also ignored the
sovereign interests of the United States in protecting its own citizens and the fact that "[m]anufac-

128. Id. (quoting Lawrence W. Newman & Rafael Castilla, Production of Evidence Tbrougb US. Courtsfor Use
in InternationalArbitration, 9J. IN'r'L ARB. 61, 69 (June 1992)).
129. Id. at 404.
130. Id

131. 853 F. Supp. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
132. Medway Power Limited, 985 F. Supp. at 405. As this article was being submitted for publication, another
judge of the same court reached the same conclusion as that in Medway. In re National Broadcasting Co., No.

M-77 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1998).
133. 172 F.R.D. 295, 298 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
134. Id. at 307
135. Id. at 308.
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turers producing products abroad for use in the United States are subject to the laws of the
United States..' .36 Moreover, use of Hague Convention procedures could cause delay and
frustrate U.S. policy of facilitating just, speedy, and inexpensive litigation."'
Similarly, in Fisbel v. BASF Group, an Iowa district court rejected German defendants'
arguments that the Hague Convention should take primacy over the Federal Rules."' Quoting
Aerospatiale, the district court agreed that Hague Convention procedures can be "unduly time
consuming and expensive.""'
In In re First American Corporation, a New York district court used a four-prong analysis
to determine the reasonableness of a foreign discovery request. 4 ° The factors considered were:
(1) the competing interests of the nations whose laws are in conflict; (2) the hardship of

compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought; (3) the importance of
the information and documents requested; and, (4) the good faith of the party requesting

discovery. 141
2. The Relationship of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Foreign Discovery Rules.
Other 1997 decisions also assessed the role of international comity in determining the scope
of discovery in federal court proceedings. In Odone v. Cropda InternationalPLC, the court had

to decide whether or not to limit discovery by applying a foreign privilege statute.' 42 The
plaintiff had requested discovery of documents exchanged between the defendant and its British

patent agent. The defendant declined to produce the materials, arguing that the communications
were privileged under British copyright law, and that, in the interest of comity and because
the communications did not "touch base" in the United States, the British privilege should
be honored. 1 '
The district court in Odone stated that where a federal district court has jurisdiction over a
foreign company or individual, it is not required to defer to international comity and that the

court can and should mandate compliance with the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.'44 Where federal courts have deferred to foreign statutes governing the privilege
of patent agents, the common denominator has been that the communications related solely
to activities outside the United States. That was not the case here. Moreover,
[i]t would be against U.S. public policy to limit discovery-thus preclude or hinder claims by
United States citizens of patent infringement, by awarding comity to the restrictive discovery laws
of Great Britain while at the same time extending the full panoply of our open discovery privileges
to foreign defendants that have availed themselves to the protections of U.S. patent and trademark
law pursuant to the Patent Cooperation Treaty.'
The issue of fairness in discovery procedures was also considered in Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Company v. Nippon Carbide Industries Co., in which the district court ordered
the inspection of defendant's plant in Japan, even though such an inspection might not comport
136. Id.
at309
137. Id. at 310-11.
138. 175 F.D.R. 525 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
139. Id. at 529.

140. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20137 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1997).
141. Id. at *30.
142. 950 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1997).

143. Id. at 12
144. Id.
145. Id. at 14
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withJapanese law.' 46 The court explained: "[a]lthough we are keenly sensitive to the promotion
of international comity, we cannot ignore the fact that NCI is properly within the jurisdiction
of this Court, and therefore, is 'subject to the same legal constraints, including the burdens
associated with American judicial procedures, as their American competitors.' 141
V1. Personal jurisdiction
DANIEL C. MALONE*

U.S. courts continued in 1997 to refine the legal principles governing when they may properly
adjudicate cases involving foreign parties and events. Notable developments in the law of personal
jurisdiction focused on national contacts based jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(k)(2) and assertions of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based on its activity on
the Internet.
A.

DEVELOPMENTS IN JURISDicTION BASED ON RULE

4(K)(2)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), adopted in 199 3, authorizes the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by federal courts based on contacts with the nation as a whole, rather than contacts
limited to the state of the forum.14' The outer bounds of rule 4(k)(2)'s expansion of jurisdiction,
however, have proved as yet unfixed.
1. National Contacts Based Personal jurisdiction in Admiralty Cases
While courts and commentators have sometimes assumed that the provisions of rule 4(k)(2)
support personal jurisdiction in the federal courts only in cases where subject matter jurisdiction
is premised on the federal question statute, 49 some courts have found the rule to encompass

all cases raising questions of law fundamentally federal in nature. Several courts in the past
year have considered the availability of rule 4(k)(2) as a basis of personal jurisdiction in admiralty
cases.
In World Tanker CarriersCorp. v. MV Ya Mawlaya, 5° the lower court had held that rule
4(k)(2) applied only in cases where federal jurisdiction was based on a federal question; the
rule could not support personal jurisdiction in a suit under general maritime law. The Fifth
Circuit reversed, finding the proper analysis under rule 4(k)(2) to be whether federal substantive
law provided the rule of decision, not whether federal jurisdiction was based on the federal
question statute. 5 ' Although the federal question statute did not necessarily provide federal

146. 171 F.R.D. 246 (D. Minn. 1997).
147. Id. at 249 (quoting Societe Nationale Industielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. at 540 n.25).

*Daniel C. Malone is an associate with Debevoise & Plimpton in New York, New York.
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(kX2) provides:
Territorial Limits of Effective Service ...

If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with respect to claims arising
under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not

subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see, e.g., Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 872 F. Supp. 81, 87
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Rule 4(kX2) only provides federal courts with personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
in federal question cases . . .") (dictum).
150. 99 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 1996).
151. Id. at 720-22.
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